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FOREWORD
The threat environment is becoming increasingly
complex, especially where it is difficult to determine
exactly who the enemy is. This situation is further
exacerbated by support provided to our adversaries by
criminal entities as well as prominent individuals in
nation-states to whom we may be providing assistance.
Traditionally, organized crime has been deemed to be
a problem for law enforcement agencies as opposed to
the military. Similarly, any challenge related to host
nation-states has been considered to be a political problem that must be dealt with through diplomacy. While
law enforcement agencies and government departments may need to take the lead on these matters, it
is no longer a problem for any one agency or department to solve. The problem affects us all and the U.S.
Army needs to become actively involved in improving
its understanding of the challenge in terms of how it
will affect military operations, as well as find ways to
counter the problem.
British academic and practitioner Dr. Shima Keene
describes the collaboration between nonstate actors,
organized crime, and subversive elements of host
nations as “silent partnerships,” and explains how
these partnerships can undermine military operations.
In addition, Dr. Keene describes how the threat could
potentially be turned into an advantage for the U.S.
Army through exploiting the pressure points identified once the nature of these relationships are better
understood.
Dr. Keene is an established subject matter expert
in the fields of asymmetric warfare, counterterrorism,
counter serious organized crime, and stabilization.
Through her work in government, law enforcement,
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the private sector, and academia, she has developed
a deep insight into how the partnerships operate. In
addition, her ongoing work as a civilian adviser in
the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps Headquarters based in the United Kingdom has
given her insight into how the military could further
its understanding of these silent partnerships. Critically, she suggests how this understanding could be
incorporated into military planning at both strategic
and operational levels to counter the threat.
The Strategic Studies Institute considers this monograph to be a useful assessment of the key issues
related to the challenges presented by the collaboration of nonstate actors, criminal organizations, and
nation-states, as well as their collective implications
for the U.S. Army. It makes a valuable contribution to
the debate on how to plan and shape future U.S. peace
and stability operations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The U.S. Army increasingly faces adversaries
that are difficult to define. The threat landscape is further blurred by cooperation between transnational
organized crime groups and irregular armed formations, linked directly or indirectly to governments
or individual authority figures in nation-states. At a
fundamental level, the motivations and aspirations
of transnational organized crime groups differ from
those held by irregular groups. However, in practice,
there are many similarities in terms of their modus
operandi and the harm they cause, often making it difficult to distinguish one from the other. This collaboration, whatever its exact nature, is problematic, because
it confounds understanding of the adversary, making
existing countermeasures less effective and thus
directly challenging U.S. national security interests.
Using the term “silent partners” to describe the collaboration between organized crime groups (OCGs),
irregular groups, and nation-states is appropriate, as
these partnerships are unlikely to be publicly or willingly acknowledged. In many cases, even the existence
of such relationships is likely to be denied not only by
those directly involved, but also by the international
community tasked with providing assistance for the
purpose of peace-building or state-building. This is
because interventions to support and strengthen host
nations will lose credibility if many of the key political figures are acknowledged as directly or indirectly
involved with organized crime or irregular groups.
In addition, there is also political pressure on those
involved in state-building interventions to get positive
results quickly.
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However, these partnerships are a reality that
cannot and must not be ignored as they have the ability to undermine interventions carried out not only
by the U.S. Army and its military allies, but also by
the international community more broadly, working
toward the same goal to stabilize a fragile or postconflict state. The risks identified in this monograph
will impact military planning at an operational and
strategic level, as well as impact U.S. foreign policy
overall as a result of the involvement of nation-states.
Furthermore, military action taken without full
appreciation of the dynamics of the nature of these
relationships is likely to be ineffective at best or suffer
negative second and third-order effects. This can be
best avoided by developing a deeper appreciation
of the relationship dynamics of adversary networks,
enabling U.S. Army intelligence officers to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of the relationships that can
then be exploited as appropriate to the advantage of
the U.S. Army.
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SILENT PARTNERS: ORGANIZED CRIME,
IRREGULAR GROUPS, AND NATION-STATES
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Army increasingly faces adversaries that
are difficult to define. The threat landscape is further
blurred by cooperation between irregular armed formations and organized crime groups (OCGs). Tackling
OCGs has traditionally been considered to be a law
enforcement responsibility, therefore outside the remit
of the military. However, close collaboration between
OCGs and irregular groups often makes it impossible to make a clear distinction between the two. The
approach to countering these adversaries continues to
be to treat them as two distinct groups, but this makes
interventions against both of them less effective. This is
problematic for the U.S. Army as the inability to tackle
the collective threat effectively has a direct impact
on counterintelligence (COIN) operations. To further
exacerbate the situation, OCG and irregular group
networks are often linked directly or indirectly to governments in countries that are emerging from conflict.
This has further negative implications for both peacekeeping and state-building interventions, which may
be undertaken by the U.S. Army as part of unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral missions.
In the face of such complex interdependencies as
well as fragility, military action taken without a full
appreciation of the dynamics of the nature of these
relationships is likely to be ineffective at best, or
suffer unintended consequences. For example, measures intended to strengthen the host nation-state and
bring stability may do the reverse by strengthening
the enemy if the state has a collaborative relationship
1

with these groups. This can be best mitigated through
developing a deeper appreciation of the relationship
dynamics between the wider adversarial networks.
This knowledge will enable U.S. Army intelligence
officers to identify the strengths and weaknesses of
these relationships that may be exploited. With the
experience of operations in Iraq and current measures
to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also
know as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. Army
at an operational level is already acutely aware of the
implications of confronting adversaries with covert
nation-state support. Observation of Russian hybrid
warfare techniques and especially leveraging OCGs
for political aims suggests that the U.S. Army may also
face similar challenges in Europe in the future.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for a preemptive
study of the problem, as well as how it may be countered. Furthermore, the implications of this problem
span a range of disciplines. Specifically, they affect
both military planning at operational and strategic
levels, and more broadly U.S. foreign policy because
of the involvement of nation-states.
Using the term “silent partners” to describe the
collaboration between OCGs, irregular groups, and
nation-states is appropriate, as these partnerships are
unlikely to be publicly or willingly acknowledged (see
figure 1). In many cases, even the existence of such
relationships is likely to be denied not only by those
directly involved, but also by the international community tasked with providing assistance for the purpose
of peace-building or state-building. This is because
interventions to support and strengthen host nations
will lose credibility if many of the key political figures
are acknowledged as directly or indirectly involved
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with OCGs or irregular groups. In addition, there is
also political pressure on those involved in statebuilding interventions to get positive results quickly.
This often results in a lack of appetite on the part of
policymakers and decision-makers at home to recognize the reality on the ground.

Figure 1. Silent Partners
Nevertheless, these partnerships are a reality that
cannot be ignored. Given that a country emerging from
conflict is likely to have lacked any form of legitimate
central authority for significant periods of time, this
situation inevitably results in alternative “authorities”
such as OCGs or irregular groups taking hold to fill the
vacuum. Some individuals holding public office may
also struggle to disengage from such groups as a result
of economic and political pressures or fear. In many
cases, there is a dependence on adversary groups for
leadership, as this is where the real power post-conflict
may still remain. As a result, any power shift to legitimate authorities is likely to take considerable time. In
the interim, there is likely to be a need to continue to
work with individuals and groups deemed undesirable. Consequently, these relationships are silenced.
However, if not recognized and managed effectively,
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these silent partnerships will only exacerbate instability in any fragile state.
In furthering the understanding of the dynamics of
these silent partnerships, this monograph will examine
their three main components; namely OCGs both local
and transnational, irregular groups, and nation-states.
As the three components interact with each other at
multiple levels, the analysis will begin by examining
the subject of organized crime, before examining the
relationship between OCGs and irregular groups, followed by that of OCGs and nation-states, and ending
with conclusions and recommendations.
ORGANIZED CRIME
For most of the 20th century, organized crime was
predominantly seen as a law enforcement problem.
However, this changed during the 1990s when organized crime, especially transnational organized crime
(TOC), evolved to become a wide-ranging security
issue as a consequence of globalization and market
deregulation.1 The end of the Cold War resulted in
access to new markets, facilitated by deregulation,
enabling the movement of both licit and illicit goods.2
Globalization, together with technological advancements, further compounded the situation. As Internet and cell phone technologies became increasingly
accessible and affordable, they also inadvertently supported the activities of global criminal networks. Consequently, OCGs flourished, taking advantage of all
the technological, physical, and economic advantages
globalization had to offer, enabling them to expand
geographically across borders to become better networked and interconnected than ever before.
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The 2000 United Nations (UN) Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime represented a milestone in global policy response to the threat.3 However, the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) shortly
afterwards diverted the attention of the international
community to terrorism. This is undoubtedly part of
the reason why the subject of organized crime was not
even in the vocabulary of policymakers, intelligence
analysts, or military planners when the United States
invaded Iraq in March 2003.4 Consequently, the rise of
organized crime in Iraq was a strategic surprise for decision-makers.5 This is highly relevant for the U.S. Army
not only in terms of current and future operations relating to Iraq, but with respect to military operations in
general. This is because the situation regarding OCGs
is not unique to Iraq―parallels have been observed in
other countries including Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and
the Balkans, and in particular Albania.6 Experience to
date has shown that OCGs play a considerable role in
destabilizing any fragile environment and negatively
impact interventions aimed at achieving stabilization,
peacekeeping, and development objectives.
In recognition of this, attention has returned in
recent years to questions regarding the impact of organized crime on development and security.7 For example, the World Development Report 2011 published by
the World Bank underscored the importance of treating organized crime as a new threat that compromises
development, and called for a more strategic focus to
broaden existing law enforcement initiatives.8 Warnings about the rise of organized crime also came from
several additional sources including the UN Office of
Drugs and Crime (UNODC).9 However, more needs to
be done strategically as well as tactically to address the
issue, which has historically been sidelined in defense.
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The reason, as previously mentioned, is partly as a
result of organized crime being viewed as separate to
insurgency groups, and thus considered outside the
immediate remit of the military. The matter is also far
from straightforward from a legal standpoint. Military
action must be justified as compliant with the law of
armed conflict (LoAC).10 One issue is that members
of OCGs are likely to be considered as non-combatants, and are therefore outside the scope of justification for military action.11 However, this does not mean
that intelligence assessments and strategic considerations should exclude non-combatants. Assessments
of impact on civilians, especially as potential collateral damage, inevitably become greatly more complex
when those civilians are a component of the enemy
that the military is targeting.
The complex nature of the threat has been heavily
debated in recent years alongside ongoing criticism
that existing international law is no longer adequate
to counter it. This is because in asymmetric warfare,
the distinction between combatant and civilian is often
far from clear.12 The problem is that International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) only recognizes wars as
armed conflicts fought between two or more states or
in the context of civil or internal wars, and not between
states and substate entities, namely irregular forces.13
In other words, it is outdated. Consequently, the inevitable ambiguity surrounding the applicability of LoAC
is becoming increasingly problematic in justifying military action, especially in relation to kinetic action.14
This partly explains why it is difficult for the military
to engage in action that is likely to result in the killing of OCG members who are defined as non-combatants. However, this is far from being a new problem.
Coordination between military action and the criminal
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justice approach to tackle adversaries who are illdefined is already well-established. For example, joint
operations between the military and law enforcement
have been ongoing in the fight against international
terrorism to the extent that U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military operatives have been described
as being “indistinguishable from each other.”15
The fusion model between military and civilian
security forces and agencies is also not a new concept.
One example is the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center,
which was set up in 2007 as a collaboration between
U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) agencies to counter
narcotics in Afghanistan, consisting of military, civilian, and law enforcement personnel.16 The model
works because military and civilian (to include law
enforcement) elements are deployed appropriately
as the situation demands on the ground. Similarly, in
Northern Ireland, joint operations between military
and law enforcement agencies to tackle Irish terrorism is well-established as a consequence of the Irish
Republican Army’s (IRA) involvement with organized
crime.17
However, an additional challenge in terms of the
ambiguous nature of the adversary is that OCGs as an
entity are often difficult to define. Although this monograph does not intend to enter a debate surrounding
the definition of organized crime per se, a brief consideration of what OCGs actually are is necessary to
understand what actions are needed to counter the
threat. This monograph will therefore adopt the broad
definition put forward by the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, where OCGs are
described as:
a structured group of three or more persons, existing
for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim
7

of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in
order to obtain financial or other material benefit.18

In practice, organized crime is about making
money.19 It is about making as much money as possible as quickly as possible through any means available,
both legitimate and illicit. In terms of how organized
crime manifests itself, according to UK Prime Minister
Teresa May, speaking as Home Secretary in July 2014,
“Organised crime is not what you think it is.”20
Public perception is often influenced by the glamorized portrayal of organized crime in fictional representations in television and film, as opposed to the
less sophisticated groupings of “seedy, immoral, and
grubby individuals” who make up a typical OCG.21
This mismatch between reality and perception equally
applies to the methods and resources available to tackle
the threat, and subconsciously influences expectations
at every level. Public perception is important in democratic governments, as policies are often driven by
public opinion since politicians need public support to
be elected or re-elected. The voting public make their
assessment as to whether a leader has been successful
or not, based on their knowledge and understanding
of what the issues are. Therefore, politicians need to be
able to demonstrate that they are taking appropriate
action against identified problems. It follows that if the
public’s perception of a particular threat is incorrect,
this will have an unintended effect on how the threat
is handled.22 Politicians set security priorities as policy,
which then filter down to security institutions such as
the police. Those then become force priorities, irrespective of whether the security situation on the ground
matches those priorities, impacting resources spent on
issues deemed to be less of a priority to politicians. A
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further problem is that a threat such as organized crime
has numerous dimensions. However, for the problem
to be easily understood by non-specialists, a gross simplification of the problem typically occurs which can
be counterproductive.
The tendency for oversimplification and generalizations in describing and tackling organized crime has
been observed widely by scholars and practitioners.
In the context of fragile states in particular, there is a
further tendency to use the term “OCGs” or “TOC” to
describe all types of organized crime activity, as well as
seeing TOC as an inevitable consequence of the fragile
environment without understanding the dynamics of
how and why this occurs. According to the 2012 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) report on transnational crime:
The sweeping generalisations which are often used to
bracket together international crime and fragile states as a
leading global “threat” tend to ignore important nuances
in the way particular countries and regions have been
incorporated into illicit markets.23

This paradigm is not only misleading but also counterproductive. This is because different types of OCGs
exist, each requiring a different response to counter
their particular threat. For example, the OECD report
identifies four distinct categories of OCGs that operate
in these environments, namely local organizations primarily concerned with local crime; local organizations
with global reach (illicit production); transnational
logistical networks; and fragile states serving as transit
points for TOC.
In terms of the first category, local crime may occur
and become exacerbated as a result of the absence of a
functioning state or in collusion with the state. Examples have been observed in post-conflict countries
9

such as the Central African Republic, Burundi, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where OCGs have been involved
in significant criminal activity with strong state links.
However, their linkages to transnational illicit markets are of marginal importance, or are sporadic rather
than systemic. In tackling localized crime, a localized
disruption strategy utilizing local actors, while giving
thought to how the delicate matter of state involvement should be handled, is required.
In comparison, a more international approach
is necessary when tackling local organizations with
global reach. These can be described as the origin of
TOC as it is predominantly involved with producer
nations of illicit or restricted goods, which are manufactured in conditions of conflict and distributed
to the global market through international commercial intermediaries. Examples include Colombia for
cocaine and Sierra Leone for diamonds.24 In the case
of Colombia in the 1980s, distribution was carried out
through homegrown mafia groups with international
scope.25 Here, the effective distribution capability was
arguably more important than the production of the
cocaine itself, as without the ability to get the “product” to market, profit cannot be made. As such, the key
factor that determines the success of this type of OCG
is its illicit supply chain which requires logistical skills
in transport and delivery, as well as domestic and
international connections to succeed. Here, domestic
and international interventions combined would seem
most appropriate to disrupt the criminal network both
in-country and internationally.
The significance of the third category identified,
namely transnational logistical networks, is that they
play a central role as intermediaries in the global distribution of illicit goods. Although as much as 85 percent
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of the total value of TOC is estimated to derive from
the drug trade according to the UNODC, established
illicit networks can also be utilized for other criminal
commodities.26 The logistical skillsets and established
contacts developed through these networks are also
useful in human trafficking, piracy, counterfeit goods,
and arms trafficking.27 Cocaine routes from West
Africa to Europe serve as a case in point, which are also
utilized by OCGs for human smuggling and human
trafficking.28
The fourth and final category identified by the
OECD is nation-states, which allow countries to
become safe havens for global, local, and international
crime. This is highly relevant as the state, which is supposed to disrupt crime, is instead a sponsor and an
enabler of crime; here, to assume that all elements of
the state are involved in OCG activity would be a mistake. Corruption plays a key role, and the reasons as to
why and how this occurs will be explored in detail in
the section entitled “OCGs and Nation-States.”
One key consideration when tackling OCGs is to
recognize the shift of emphasis from production to
logistics that has taken place over the last 10 years,
which has resulted in significant changes in the way
that an OCG, especially TOC groups, are now
structured. Historically, hierarchical groups such as
the Sicilian mafia, the Chinese triads, or the Japanese
yakuza, usually based around kinship networks or a
shared ethnic background, have dominated the organized crime space.29 Although traditional hierarchical
groups continue to exist, there is growing evidence
to suggest that TOC activity has moved away from a
system of hierarchical, turf-based groups into interconnected, flexible, and opportunistic networks. Unlike
traditional OCGs, these new formations comprise
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broader, devolved, and less formal structures, often
lacking formally defined roles for its members, where
continuity of membership is often less of a defining
factor.30 Additionally, they may move into new areas
of action, leave old ones, or enter different criminal
enterprises, depending on a series of political, economic, and structural factors.31
Another recent change that has been observed in
many countries is the move away from a monopolistic
setting where one or two larger criminal organizations
control international criminal trade, to the emergence
of smaller, more reactive networks. For example, in
Kenya, approximately 10 groups with up to 20 members each that have strong connections to the political
elite, account for the management of most of the drug
trade.32 This flatter, more informal structure has come
about partly as a result of advancements in communications technology which require less formalized command and control structures to be in place.33 These less
formal structures can make it difficult for intelligence
analysts to conduct network analysis that is up-to-date
and relevant operationally, as relationships and memberships constantly evolve.
Another factor that military intelligence officers
and commanders must consider is the impact of OCGs
on regional stability. Groups operating in hostile, as
opposed to stable, environments are more likely to be
openly involved in violent crime. Recent research has
shown that many countries experiencing high levels
of organized violent crime have emerged from significant armed conflicts.34 Of course there are exceptions,
like Mexico, where the level of extreme violence perpetrated by the drug cartels such as beheadings and
disembowelments has caused parts of the country to
be described as similar to a war zone.35 Here, it was the
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imported problem of drug cartels in Colombia seeking
refuge that resulted in a state of violent conflict. However, in most cases, the general consensus is that the
lawless environment of conflict or post-conflict states
tends to foster more violent organized crime.
The significance to the U.S. Army is that organized crime can prolong or exacerbate conflict not
only through the violent actions of OCGs, which
cause instability, but also through OCG funding or
resourcing of armed groups. In some cases, criminal
enterprises have provided economic incentives for the
continuation of conflict.36 In addition, OCG activity can
be harmful to stabilization, peace-building, and development in several other ways. For example, criminal
funds may distort the political process by funding the
activities of some political parties and not others. This
in turn may result in corrupt parties getting into power
or retaining power, leading to public discontent and
ultimately to further conflict and violence.
Another destabilizing factor of widespread OCG
presence is its impact on the local economy. This has
several security implications. For example, economic
instability can lead to public discontent and social
upheavals, and can also lead to a further increase in
crime where legitimate means of economic survival
are not possible. Also, in fragile environments where
interventions are taking place to strengthen the local
economy, organized crime may undermine such
actions through intimidation and violence. One consequence is that real or threatened violence is likely
to prevent new businesses from opening, thus reducing legitimate employment opportunities as well as
fair trade and market competition. A poor economic
environment will also result in brain drain, as well as
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scaring away foreign investors and donors who will
take their investments elsewhere.
A case in point is Somalia, where wealthy Somalis travel to set up businesses in neighboring countries
such as Kenya, illustrating that criminal money also
migrates to more stable environments. For example,
according to UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
estimates, only one-third of kidnap ransom payments from maritime piracy in Somalia remain in the
country.37 The poor security and economic climate in
Somalia has resulted in Somali pirates investing and
laundering money from their illegally obtained ransom
payments in Kenya or sending it abroad to Somali
diaspora communities further afield such as in Minneapolis, Minnesota.38 This is partly because without a
vibrant economy, there is no place to invest or spend
the money. This phenomenon is often ignored in the
context of international development, despite the fact
that it constitutes one of the reasons why development
funds are diverted to corrupt payments as the economic environment in–country does not allow for a
sufficient influx of money.
Even where criminal money stays in-country, not
only in relation to Somalia but to fragile states in general, there are other negative consequences which
affect the local economy and have a destabilizing
influence in the region. One example is price inflation,
which can occur as a result of the circulation of criminal money. This in turn increases the cost of living and
makes those struggling to survive even poorer, and
even more dependent on aid. In situations where aid
is unavailable, the only means of survival will be to
resort to crime, joining an OCG or insurgency group
in return for payment or sustenance, further strengthening the position of these groups.39 Other negative
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impacts of crime on society include the trafficking
and distribution of narcotics. The objective of making
as much money as quickly as possible irrespective of
cost to life is a key characteristic of organized crime.
Criminal groups have been and continue to be associated with narcotics, which is one way of amassing considerable profits quickly. The use of narcotics further
exacerbates weak security environments by destroying
communities and spreading disease. In terms of legal
drugs and medication, OCGs are also involved in the
production of counterfeit medicines causing harm to
those who can least afford it.40 In short, there is a wide
variety of ways in which OCGs pose a threat to security and peace, and the problem is compounded when
they collaborate with irregular groups.
Organized Crime and Irregular Groups
There is acknowledgment among scholars and
practitioners that OCGs and irregular groups work
together to enhance their own goals. Some scholars
support the convergence theory whereby OCGs and
irregular groups (to include terrorist organizations)
collaborate through alliances and tactical appropriation, ultimately reaching convergence at some central
point.41 Others have argued that these partnerships
have gone even beyond convergence to emerge into
hybrid groups, which share common ground in ideology, modus operandi, and profit generation.42 However, before elaborating on the precise nature of the
relationship between the two entities, a brief overview
as to what is meant by irregular groups may be helpful.
As irregular groups come in so many forms, it is
easier to describe what they are not, as opposed to listing all their various forms. This approach has also been
adopted under IHL, where the term “irregular forces”
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refers to combatants that form part of a country’s armed
forces in an armed conflict and that do not belong to
the country’s regular forces.43 To be categorized as
“regular armed forces,” the four Hague Conventions
(1899, 1907, and Hague IV) conditions must be met.
First, they are commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates to a party of conflict. Second, regular
forces have a fixed distinctive emblem, recognizable at
a distance. Third, they carry arms openly; and fourth,
they conduct operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.44 Combat forces that do not satisfy these criteria are referred to as irregular forces. As
such, insurgency groups and terrorist organizations
fall under the definition of irregular groups.
In terms of the differences between OCGs and
irregular groups, at a fundamental level, the motivations and aspirations of OCGs are arguably different.
OCGs are driven predominantly by economic gain and
power; whereas irregular groups may be seen as being
more motivated by political change.
In many ways, the drivers for OCGs are similar to
private sector organizations whose aim is also to maximize profit. The one key difference is that the latter
attempt to achieve this through legitimate means,
whereas OCGs will achieve this through any means
available. The comparison is important as the countering of OCGs, and in particular their finances, should
include adopting and adapting business competition
models for disruption purposes. As OCGs are essentially a business, albeit criminal, they generally intend
to enjoy the proceeds of their crimes whereas irregular
groups may be more willing to die fighting for their
cause.
The primary motivation for terrorism and irregular
groups in general, however, is not financial. Finance
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is a means to an end, in the form of ideological and
political aspirations.45 In the case of international terrorism, terrorists are able to generate income through
their ability to raise money from donations from those
who share their ideology and political ambitions. A
significant portion of terrorist funding is derived from
donors, some of whom are fully aware of the intended
purpose of their contributions, and others who are
not.46 Given the choice, many terrorist groups would
ideally fund themselves through legitimate means,
especially in stable countries where there is a higher
risk of prosecution and imprisonment if caught. This is
because the planning and execution of terrorist activities is of high risk. As such, it needs to remain covert
in order to minimize disruption from the authorities
and to ensure that a successful terrorist attack can take
place. Maintaining a low profile is a high priority, but
involvement in illegal activities may attract unwanted
attention. In terms of disruption, even if the terrorist organization and its activities are known to the
authorities, there may be inadequate evidence to arrest
or disrupt their activities based on terrorism charges.
However, involvement in criminal activity enables
arrests and subsequent criminal prosecutions based on
this activity rather than terrorist activities. As such, it
is in the interest of terrorists to appear as legitimate as
possible at every level, for as long as possible.47 Nevertheless, where legitimate sources of funding such
as donations are inadequate or unavailable, terrorists
seek alternative sources by turning to criminal activity. As with criminal networks, terrorist organizations
also derive funding from a variety of criminal activities ranging in scale and sophistication from low-level
crime to involvement in serious organized crime.48
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The situation is slightly different in the context
of fragile states, where additional opportunities for
income exist for terrorist organizations and irregular
groups. For example, where a group is in control of a
territory, their revenue will derive from local “taxes”
collected at checkpoints or from local commodities
such as oil. Other sources of income include: ransoms
from kidnappings; the smuggling of natural resources,
tobacco, narcotics, and human trafficking; fraud; and
cybercrime.49 Irregular groups have also been observed
taxing the illicit flows of OCGs in exchange for securing transport routes for the trafficking of drugs, contraband, humans, and natural resources. Recent evidence
with respect to ISIS highlights its use of illicit networks
to help finance their operations.50 According to the
OECD and the Financial Action Task Force, ISIS:
manages a sophisticated extortion racket by robbing,
looting, and demanding a portion of the economic
resources in areas where it operates, which is similar to
how some organized crime groups (and non-state conflict
actors) generate funds. This vast range of extortion,
including everything from fuel and vehicle taxes to school
fees for children, is done under the auspices of providing
notional services or protection.51

According to the report, ISIS earns revenue primarily from five sources. Listed in order of magnitude, the
first is from the illicit proceeds from the occupation of
territory such as extortion, robbery of economic assets
and looting of banks, incomes generated from control
of oil fields and refineries, and the taxation of goods
and cash that transit territories where ISIS operates.
The second source is kidnapping ransoms, and the
third is donations including by or through non-profit
organizations (NPOs).52 The latter happens because
NPOs operating in ISIS territory have to pay for access
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or to be able to operate in areas under ISIS control. An
additional concern is that due to poor internal controls, much of the funds are simply lost in the process
of transition, both intentionally and unintentionally.53
The fourth source of income is material support such
as support associated with free trade federations. The
fifth and final source is fundraising through modern
communication networks.54
While some of the sources of ISIS funding are overtly
criminal, such as kidnapping for ransom money, others
are not. This is yet another similarity between irregular
groups and OCGs, which also utilize a variety of both
legitimate and illegitimate methods to make money.
Another resemblance is that despite the importance of
money for both entities, either as a means to an end
or as the ultimate objective, there are additional strategic advantages that can be gained from involvement
with criminal activities. For example, in Afghanistan,
the Taliban’s involvement in opium trafficking is not
only strategic in terms of sustaining the organization
financially, but also provides them with political support and legitimacy among the local population which
depend on poppy cultivation for their livelihoods. In
return, the Taliban provides them with critical services
in the form of security and market access that would
otherwise not be available.55
Such criminal activity is rife in fragile states where
the risk of prosecution is low as a consequence of weak
or absent rule of law. OCGs or irregular groups perform basic activities that in functioning states would
be provided by public sector organizations. This in
itself makes it unclear as to what can be deemed legitimate or illegitimate activity, as criminal activity refers
to activity that is outside the law. In these environments, the differences between irregular groups and
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criminal organizations become even less clear. Even
further blurring occurs as a result of similarities in
modus operandi. Examples include the use of intimidation through the threat of physical violence, and the
use of extreme and horrifying methods of violence to
induce shock and trauma.56
Both types of group have also demonstrated the
ability to move between licit and illicit markets to
finance their activities, which is particularly important
in laundering money. Traditionally, money laundering
is associated with the proceeds of crime, typically from
the sale and distribution of narcotics, which is then
moved in a way so as to disguise its origin and appear
as legitimate funds. A complex financial trail is often
used especially across geographical borders in order to
make investigations as challenging as possible. Money
laundering techniques are used not only to conceal
money originating from narcotics, but also for a whole
range of other criminal activity. In the case of terrorist finance, even “clean” money such as donations is
turned “dirty” once it is associated with a proscribed
group. Consequently, laundering techniques can also
be used to disguise funds and disassociate them from
the illegal entity.
A further resemblance relates to the organizational
structures of both entities. These can vary from hierarchical to flat, the latter representing a structure that
is more flexible and consisting of geographically diffused networks of autonomous cells (in the case of
irregular groups) or units (in the case of OCGs).57 Yet
despite these commonalities of structure and modus
operandi, the general approach to tackling the threat
has been to distinguish between the two. The distinction between irregular groups and OCGs is reflected
in official policy, both domestic and international, as
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reflected in statements and approaches emanating
from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). For
example, according to the Secretary-General’s report
to the UNSC on Resolution 2195: “terrorism and transnational organized crime are distinct phenomena, and
have different modus operandi, aims and international
legal frameworks.”58
Post 9/11, there was considerable research and discussions surrounding the so-called nexus between terrorism and organized crime. These primarily focused
on the methods (not motives) framework where terrorist groups benefited from TOC in terms of financing
and strategy. One limitation of this approach has been
the tendency to preserve a sharp distinction between
organized crime and terrorists, which has influenced
policymakers to adopt the same differentiation. This
approach has been criticized by scholars and practitioners alike, partly on the basis of the scale of convergence that has been observed between irregular/
terrorist groups and criminal organizations which represents a deeper, more strategic connection between the
two, but also because of these groups’ ability to pursue
multiple and diverse objectives simultaneously.59
The situation is further blurred through the emergence of hybrid entities. The hybrid entities concept
builds on the theory of convergence, whereby the entities continually converge to the point where the two
groups actually became one hybrid group.60 The process begins with OCGs and irregular/terrorist groups
operating in a transactional, yet largely independent
manner, where criminal services such as extortion and
money laundering are exchanged in order to facilitate
and fund terror and insurgency operations. This form
of criminal business cooperation and partnership then
evolves to a point where the organizations themselves
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transform into a hybrid group that merges tactics as
well as motives. In some cases, the merger occurs to the
extent whereby the newly formed hybrid groups lose
their original raison d’être. According to the report for
the European Parliament in 2012:
hybrid groups either begin as organized crime groups
that appropriate terror tactics and simultaneously seek
to secure political aims, or they begin as terrorist groups
that appropriate criminal capabilities to the point that
they begin to use their political (ideological) rhetoric as a
façade for perpetrating organized crime.61

Evidence to date suggests that the evolution into
a hybrid group depends on several factors such as
changes in the leadership structure, shifts in the membership base, and the loss of centralized control due to
the emergence of independent factions or internal fractures. In fragile states in particular, an individual may
join a terrorist organization or an insurgency not necessarily as a result of ideological aspirations alone, but
other factors such as economic survival. In other cases,
the organization may have an inspirational leader who
may then be killed or replaced. If the successor does
not have the same leadership qualities and the ability
to inspire his followers, those individuals are likely to
lose confidence, not only in the new leadership, but the
organization as a whole. This situation could result in
its members starting to question their ongoing support
as they begin to view their cause as futile, and instead
turn their focus toward crime, which may be more
immediately financially rewarding.62 In other words,
they may still operate under a political banner, albeit
superficial, but they have essentially converted their
terrorist cell into a criminal gang.63
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The hybrid model is not a new concept and examples of hybrid groups can be found throughout recent
history. Examples include the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland and drug cartels in Peru and Colombia
during the 1980s, synonymous with narcoterrorism.64
Other example groups include the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, Abu Sayyaf Group based in the Philippines, which affiliates itself to ISIS, and the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK).65 Another example is the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has also developed into a
complex, robust, and multifaceted system of collusion
with illicit networks to finance operations, where the
shift from political objectives in favor of a criminal
enterprise has been observed in recent years.66
Irrespective of whether the irregular groups and
criminal entities have evolved into a hybrid group or
whether irregular groups have turned predominantly
into a criminal enterprise for opportunistic reasons, the
existing approach to treat the two entities separately
is clearly problematic, as it does not reflect the reality of the threat on the ground. Further consideration
must also be given to the consequences of these alliances with respect to their impact on stability. Instead,
energy must be focused to examine how the likely
internal fragmentation and conflict could potentially be
used to the advantage of the U.S. Army. Evidence from
recent conflicts in northern Mali, Syria, Afghanistan,
and Libya suggest that involvement of warring parties
in criminal activities, in particular in illicit and criminal “economies,” has made insurgencies more prone
to internal fragmentation. The easy ability to access
sources of funding such as extortion-related funding,
technologically assisted Internet-based crime, or diversion of licit funding through NPOs, has resulted in
groups further down the chain of command becoming
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more financially self-sufficient. One consequence
of the ability to self-fund is that it allows groups to
become autonomous and less dependent on a central
command. This independence can create internal discipline problems, making it more difficult for leadership to exercise authority over an increasing number of
factions. In other words, it is capable of eroding lines of
command and in-group cohesion.67 Such weaknesses
have traditionally been exploited by law enforcement
agencies in tackling OCGs and could also be further
explored and exploited by the U.S. Army.
For example, as previously mentioned, financial gain is a key motivation for OCGs and financial
disputes can disrupt relationships. Financial intelligence analysis from Afghanistan revealed that money
intended for essential supplies for Taliban fighters was
often siphoned off at the top of the hierarchy, causing
considerable resentment and affecting morale on the
ground. This in turn impacted the ability and the willingness of subordinates to fight. Money is also used
to win and maintain loyalty. It therefore follows that
avoidable delays or evidence of misuse of such funds
will lead to loss of internal support, infighting, and
damage to the operational effectiveness of the group.
As such, the U.S. Army could seek to do more through
better use of financial intelligence, which may be
turned into a weapon to its advantage.68
The subject of money is even more relevant in
tackling organized crime. Information (true or false)
regarding missing funds, or payments deemed to be
unequal or unfair, can be immensely damaging, causing tensions potentially leading to breakdowns in relationships and weakened criminal networks if critical
nodes are targeted with this kind of disinformation.
Trust is fragile. In addition to general hearsay, the use
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of social media in particular can result in generating
doubt, resulting in the breakdown of trust. Ultimately,
there is a tendency for people to believe what they
want to believe. If there is already suspicion of wrongdoing, even a small amount of “evidence” is enough
to satisfy that suspicion.69 Such methods are already
widely used by our adversaries to generate dissent
and anger, which in turn are capable of causing internal disruption. In addition to traditional methods of
disseminating misinformation, the Internet, in particular access to real-time social media, allow for effective information operations. For example, Russia has
been repeatedly implicated in media manipulation
and attempts at destabilization through social media.
Moscow is reported to achieve its strategic communications effects through spreading targeted misinformation including the simultaneous release of multiple
false versions of an event. This has the effect of blurring the lines between what is real and what is fabricated. As the information realm becomes polluted, the
intended result is that none of the versions, including
the truth, is believed.70 In the case of OCGs, the potential breakdown of trust, coupled with the ability to
self-fund, is likely to result in autonomous cells pursuing opportunistic alliances with OCGs and non-state
armed groups. One further consequence is that these
partnerships are likely to be constantly shifting and
reconfiguring. This in turn poses several challenges for
military intelligence officers.
The first challenge relating to the dynamic nature
of alliances is that it makes up-to-date assessments difficult, in particular relating to social network analysis
(SNA). It also makes human intelligence assessments
more difficult as these alliances may directly impact
the reliability of information provided by the source.
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Without up-to-date knowledge as to which partnerships and collaborations have broken down, it will be
difficult to make accurate assessments as to the bona
fides of the information provided. An additional challenge presented by the ever-evolving threat environment in terms of SNA is that the situation not only
makes conflict increasingly unpredictable, but it also
complicates interventions to end the conflict. This has
direct implications for the U.S. Army, which may be
involved in peacekeeping or state-building missions.
The situation is made even more complex and challenging when a third partner, in the form of elements
of the host state, enters the equation.
OCGs and Nation-States
The relationship between OCGs and nation-states
is complex. As previously highlighted, OCGs thrive
in fragile environments. Not only can OCGs have
strong links with the state, they can also substitute
for it.71 Where the state is weak, OCGs often provide
substantial public services to members of the community where the state does not or cannot. In other
words, OCGs fill the vacuum of governance functions,
which in turn can contribute to their consolidation and
sustainability over time as witnessed in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Mexico, and Brazil.72 In some cases,
organized crime has created wealth and employment,
as well as provided vital capital for economic growth.
In countries where government bureaucracy lacks
transparency and accountability, economic growth
is invariably suboptimal as taxes and other resources
collected by the state from the general population
are often used to supplement the wealth of those in
power.73 In the absence of social welfare programs,
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underground economies often provide social safety
by providing employment, which in some cases may
make the difference between subsistence and destitution. One example is in Colombia, where the cocaine
trade has provided subsistence for thousands of farmers who would otherwise be forced into poverty.74
Consequently, it is unsurprising that in fragile
states, which suffer from underdeveloped economies,
state officials may either overlook or even choose to
promote informal economic activity, especially if the
officials themselves are able to benefit personally from
such activities.75 This is particularly the case where
economic opportunities upon which to base economic
growth are also limited, which will inevitably be the
case in most fragile states, especially as a result of the
environment of insecurity which will deter investors.
Clearly, the preference would be to develop any country’s economy through legitimate means. However, if
that alternative does not exist as an immediate option,
it raises some difficult questions as to how to tackle the
immediate problem. Even where a strategy for legitimate economic development may exist, implementing that strategy to the point where the benefits can
be seen is likely to take years, possibly decades. In the
meantime, in circumstances where urgent humanitarian action is required, international aid may become
available. However, there is no guarantee that assistance will be provided by the international community. If the country in question is a high priority war
zone, such as Syria, or has fallen victim to a recent
natural disaster, it is more likely that the international
community may be interested in providing assistance.
This could take the form of governments providing
aid, which is delivered through private sector contractors or NPOs, or alternatively through NPOs raising
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funding and delivering aid independent of government.76 However, with so many countries requiring
assistance, lower priority countries, typically those
that are less publicized and do not qualify as war
zones or victims of a natural disaster, may struggle to
receive aid. Furthermore, even where aid may become
available, there is no guarantee that the problem will
be alleviated, especially in the mid to long term. This
is partly because delivering aid to fragile states is far
from being a simple task.
Among the many challenges is diversion risk,
where funds intended for victims are diverted to corrupt officials and adversary groups.77 This can occur
in a number of ways. Relief goods such as food or
medicine, as well as cash can be stolen through poor
management or knowingly diverted to enable NPOs to
operate in territories occupied by proscribed groups,
for example through payment of cash and/or goods
in return for protection and access.78 Aid diversion is
a sensitive subject, and little data is made available in
the public domain to illustrate the extent of the problem. However, some recent examples released to the
press include the diversion of aid for Syria, where in
2016 an estimated £5 million of British humanitarian
aid intended for victims of the war in Syria is believed
to have been diverted to terrorists. Another example is
in Somalia, where £500,000 of British-funded aid and
equipment was reported as having been diverted to
al-Shabaab in 2013.79 More recently in 2015, UN investigators discovered that millions of dollars of its UN
Somalia aid had been diverted, in some cases representing as much as 79 percent of the value of the aid
program.80 The reports do not indicate how or to what
extent officials collaborated with OCGs in these situations, and there is ongoing debate as to what level of
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aid diversion is acceptable, if at all.81 It is not the purpose of this analysis to discuss these issues but instead
to highlight the ways in which international aid is
diverted to benefit adversaries and corrupt officials of
nation-states.
Irrespective of diversion risk, some of those in need
will not benefit from any form of aid, and where international assistance may not be available and the state
is also unable or unwilling to provide support, the
underground economy may become the only viable
option. Economic dependence on narcotics has been
seen not only in Colombia, but also in other countries
such as Afghanistan. Since the fall of the Taliban in
2001, numerous measures by the international community have taken place to eradicate opium poppies
and to try to encourage Afghan farmers to grow alternative crops. However, these interventions have been
largely unsuccessful to date for a number of reasons.82
To begin with, in order to grow alternatives such as
wheat, good quality soil, farming equipment, irrigation systems, and electricity to run those systems are
needed. All of these are absent in most parts of Afghanistan. (This is also the case in most conflict or postconflict nations.) However, poppies can be grown in
poor quality soil with minimal irrigation, and they
do not require machinery or electricity. In addition,
harvesting the poppy is also a low-skilled, manually intensive task, which provides employment for
the local population who are generally unskilled and
uneducated, and where other options for legitimate
employment do not exist.
Even in the event that the farmer does grow another
crop, a further challenge faced by Afghan farmers is
how to get the alternative farming produce to market
so it can be sold. This requires the goods, which are
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perishable, to cross checkpoints, which are manned by
corrupt officials or insurgency groups, both requiring
additional fees to be paid. After such payments are
paid, the profit made is often not enough to sustain the
farmer and his family.83 However, if the farmer grows
poppies, it is normal practice for the “customer” to
collect the crop and make payment on collection, thus
eliminating the need to get the products to market or
to sell the goods. It is therefore understandable why
efforts to counter the production of the poppy crop
have been largely unsuccessful.84 Given the alternative of destitution, involvement with drugs may be an
acceptable option by the local population. The downside is that production and trade are controlled by
OCGs, and as this is the main source of income generation for the population, the real power rests with
them, through economic dependence. Government
officials not only acknowledge this but also are easily
corrupted, as they stand to enjoy considerable personal
financial gain through turning a blind eye or actively
facilitating the process.
Despite the reliance on the criminal economy in
some situations where alternatives do not exist, organized crime is also a key cause for state failure.85 Collaboration between the state and OCGs weakens the
state by infiltrating every layer of its structure and
composition, seeking out and exploiting its vulnerabilities and feeding on its weaknesses. However, it is
often difficult to establish whether organized crime is
a cause or effect of state failure. In environments where
state institutions are already weak, criminal networks
further erode state authority, legitimacy, and effectiveness by fueling corruption and distorting state functions.86 This in turn deprives the state of tax revenues,
and competes with OCGs in the provision of services.
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In other words, organized crime becomes both a consequence of, and a contributor to, state fragility.87 This
is directly relevant to the U.S. Army, because state fragility and failure ultimately lead to or prolong conflict,
which has the effect of prolonging interventions by the
U.S. Army, and the international community in general attempting to stabilize the region.
The previous section highlighted the absence of
rule of law as a key factor that enables OCGs to flourish. To elaborate further, weak or non-existing rule of
law state institutions, such as the police or the judiciary, where basic knowledge and skill sets are lacking, coupled with epidemic corruption, can further
encourage organized crime involvement. For example,
police may lack the ability to investigate crimes and
present the necessary evidence in court as a result of
inadequate policing skills. Alternatively, they may be
unwilling to investigate or present evidence as a result
of corruption.88 In these situations, it is unlikely that
a criminal will even be arrested, let alone prosecuted,
for crimes committed. Even when a criminal ends up
in court, there is no guarantee that he will be found
guilty if judges are corrupt or incompetent. In addition, where a criminal is sentenced to jail, corruption
may be so endemic that the sentence becomes meaningless. A case in point is the conviction of opium
trafficker Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai, who was convicted in
2013 by the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Justice Center
(CNJC)89 for offenses relating to drug trafficking and
was sentenced to 15 years.90 Not long after he was sent
to prison, Ishaqzai was reported to have paid approximately US$14 million to several people throughout the
criminal justice system to secure his release.91 In this
case, the good work of the CNJC supported by the UK
and the United States was negated by the ubiquitous
nature of corruption in the Afghan penal system.
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The net result of the inability of the state to deliver
justice allows OCGs to operate more openly, as risk of
prosecution is considerably less compared to countries
enjoying an established justice system. This is particularly the case for criminals and other individuals who
have access to funds, as they are able to bribe their way
out of jail even if prosecuted, as seen in the case of Haji
Lal Jan Ishaqzai. Where criminals do not have power
or money, those who are part of an OCG are still likely
to be provided some protection through the criminal
network. This is particularly the case with clan-based
systems, where another clan member may be in a position of authority (in government) who may come to
their rescue. These factors combined make the environment conducive to organized crime and increases
the risk appetite of criminals, with the knowledge that
institutions, which should exist to disrupt their activities, instead support and further their cause.
For example, fragile states are increasingly playing a key role as intermediaries in the global distribution of illicit goods by serving as transit points for
TOC groups, one notable example being the aforementioned production and distribution of opiates
from Afghanistan.92 This partnership between the state
and OCGs can occur at a number of levels. At lower
levels of government, officials can become engaged
with OCGs through either sporadic acts of bribery by
turning a blind eye to criminal activity for payment, or
active abuse of public office.93 Examples include border
guards agreeing to take a certain patrol route in order to
enable illegal shipments, not restricted to narcotics, to
pass through borders. In other cases, such acts become
so frequent that low-ranking state officials end up on
the OCG payroll.94 These payments are considered to
be a justifiable norm for many officials where salaries
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are not enough to support either himself or his family.
The view that bribery payments are acceptable is not
restricted to low ranking officials. OCGs also infiltrate
further up the state management chain by ensuring
that personnel are in place who will be supportive
of their activities. Middle ranking officials as well as
heads of agencies responsible directly or indirectly for
fighting organized crime-related activities, such as law
enforcement agencies or customs, are also targeted
because influence at these high levels can potentially
provide long-term benefits to OCGs.95 In addition to
government agencies, OCGs can also infiltrate highlevel officials such as senators, ministers, or even presidents of countries, with power to directly influence
state policymaking, law making, law enforcement, and
judicial decisions. This will typically involve extortion
and family links to high-level officials.96
In all cases, corruption acts as a bond between the
state and organized crime. Corruption is defined as “the
abuse of public office for private gain.”97 In the context
of organized crime, corruption may be characterized
as the ways in which OCGs can infiltrate or penetrate
the state. In terms of how this can occur, John Bailey
and Roy Godson have developed two models, which
describe the relationship between organized crime and
corruption. In the first “centralized-systemic” model,
political leaders directly control the webs of alliances
between OCGs and the state in a top-down approach.
In this scenario, the head of state is typically the main
benefactor of organized crime, where OCGs are not
as much a consequence of weak governments, but the
product of corrupt political officials.98 In the second
“fragmented-contested” model, there is a far more fluid
and complex set of relationships between the political system and organized crime. In this decentralized
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structure, criminal-political alliances are dynamic and
constantly mutating.99
In both scenarios, corruption is a key enabler for
OCGs.100 The relationship between organized crime
and corruption can be understood by the differentiation between primary and enabling activities of OCGs.
Primary activities are those from which OCGs generate
profit. Enabling activities are those that make possible
and/or facilitate the conduct of these primary activities.
As a key enabling factor, corruption may take many
different forms, varying from petty bribery of customs
officials, to ignoring drug shipments, to the integration
of high-level border officials or even national politicians into the illegal trafficking networks.101 It is also
worth noting that although organized crime is most
commonly associated with illegal goods and services,
primary activities do not necessarily need to be illegal
under the laws of the state in question. Russia provides
a case in point. The rise of Russian organized crime
in the 1990s has been attributed less as a result of the
demand for illegal goods or services than to a poorly
planned transition from socialist to capitalist economy and the privatization of state property.102 This
required corrupt public officials and a number of state
institutions to work with OCGs in order to facilitate
these activities, where large amounts of licit commodities were dealt with in illicit ways.103 The OCG-state
partnership in this situation involved crimes requiring
access to information or goods held by government
officials, backed up by the use or threat of force by
crime groups.104
An OCG-state partnership involving both licit and
illicit activities is not unique to Russia. Fraud and the
general abuse of development aid funds have been
commonplace in countries where international interventions have taken place. For example, between
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US$31 and US$60 billion were lost as a result of contracting waste and fraud in Afghanistan and Iraq
between 2002 and 2011.105 Although it is uncertain
what role organized crime had played, or what proportion of lost funds were a result of fraud or general
mismanagement, it is evident that corruption enabled
the loss to occur.
However, one repeated lesson from previous
missions has been the inability of the international
community to tackle corruption despite it being recognized as a central factor in undermining international
interventions.106 In terms of the military, many do not
see the subject of tackling corruption as a priority, but
rather as a specialist issue that should be dealt with by
other organizations. This view is illustrated by North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in 2008 who recognized the
importance of corruption, but at the same time illustrated the adoption of a passive approach:
to the extent it [corruption] is not linked to military
activities—it is not NATO’s first responsibility—there are
other organisations and donors that work on development
cooperation that focus a bit more on this topic.107

The tendency to sideline the issue of corruption
was also noted in relation to the UN by Lieutenant
General H. R. McMaster, at the time of this writing the
National Security Advisor to U.S. President Donald
Trump: “The dominant attitude [of the UN] towards
corruption was one of passivity in reference to the
problem and understanding the political nature of the
problem.”108 According to McMaster, this view was not
restricted to the UN but extended to the international
community (IC) as a whole:
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the IC was passive about it [corruption] and largely
ignorant about the scope of the problem, […] its impact
on the mission, the Afghan state and the Afghan people.
And it was this lack of understanding that drove, I
think, complacency about the problem and drove this
simplistic interpretation of corruption that is really
bigotry masquerading as cultural sensitivity: this idea
that Afghans are corrupt and there’s nothing we can do
about it.109

The conclusions McMaster reached as a result
of his leadership as former Head of Combined Joint
Interagency Task Force - Shafafiyat in 2011, tasked to
understand the corruption threats in Afghanistan, was
that “there was a connection with a criminal underworld and a political upper world” and the need to
better understand and improve “the [international]
ability to identify the subversive campaigns of criminal networks, narcotics trafficking organizations and
insurgencies.”110
The relevance to the U.S. Army is that in recent
years, peacekeeping operations have served as a vehicle for the delivery of wider state functions, such as
border security and crime fighting, as well as a coordination mechanism for other actors, becoming a focal
point for longer-term capacity building. The inability
to tackle corruption results in failure of those missions,
inevitability prolonging conflict with security implications both at home and abroad.
CONCLUSIONS
The impact of organized crime on all aspects of
military activity to include combat, peace-building,
and development continues to be sidelined, despite
evidence of its ability to undermine all types of operations. Organized crime has been, and continues to be,
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a neglected dimension of conflict, and unless active
measures to contain and reduce it are included as part
of a comprehensive approach that goes well beyond
the current counterinsurgency model, it will continue
to provide a resource base for insurgents as well as sectarian militias.
One issue is that OCGs are treated as being separate to and distinct from irregular groups; thus are
considered outside the immediate remit of the military. However, this approach is no longer adequate.
This is especially true since organized crime is no
longer solely in the domain of traditional hierarchical
mafia-type organizations. Instead, many have developed into dynamic global networks capable of simultaneously supporting terrorist and criminal agendas.
These mergers in some cases have evolved further into
hybrid entities, as witnessed in numerous theaters of
conflict to include Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and
Iraq. This is an increasing trend representing a major
dimension of contemporary conflict, which needs to be
addressed.
However, knowledge and understanding on the
extent and nature of this relationship and the mechanisms that support this collaboration remain weak, as
is the study of ways in which the threat can be mitigated. Although there has been attention given to
the so-called nexus between terrorism and organized
crime, there are dangers of overly conflating the two,
which could lead to misguided policy and interventions. Instead, there is a need to explore potential areas
of competition and divergence among these groups,
which could be exploited to the advantage of the U.S.
Army and the international community as a whole.
This will require a move away from the existing methods, not motives, based strategy to a new approach that
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is more flexible, integrated, and holistic in its thinking
and delivery.
This type of new thinking is particularly necessary
given the involvement of nation-states, which further
enable these groups to operate. The reasons and ways
in which this collaboration occurs are many. However,
at the heart of the issue is corruption, which serves as
a bond between criminals and corrupt state officials,
enabling crime to flourish. Corruption is a key issue that
undermines peacekeeping missions and state-building
interventions; but, to date, the international community, to include the U.S. Army, and Armed Forces in
general, has adopted a passive stance on the matter.
This needs to change if any real progress is to be made.
To understand the silent partnerships between
OCGs, irregular groups, and nation-states is to understand the network―what the network is and how it
works. One challenge facing intelligence analysts is
that these networks are dynamic in nature, and alliances are consistently shifting. Without careful allocation of resources, they could all be expended in
attempts to keep up with changes. Although up-todate SNA is an absolute necessity to carry out tactical
operations on the ground, further consideration must
be given to what brings these networks together. The
answer is profit, which is the key driver of all three
entities. However, to date, there has been a failure on
the part of the military and the international community as a whole to appreciate fully the profiteering
incentives of warring protagonists, and how these
may evolve from war-based economies into crimebased economies.111 Although in recent years, there has
been more attention given to various aspects of threat
finance such as terrorist finance, insurgency finance,
or the movement of narcotics money, the analysis has
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been overly compartmentalized and basic at best. This
will inevitably result in the lagging of developments to
countering the threat, and a reactive approach that is
no longer adequate, especially considering the pace at
which the modus operandi of criminals is developing.
As Professor Barry Rider has observed: “Of course, in
truth, thinking criminals have always sought to place
themselves beyond the reach of the law, and it is not
just a matter of having a faster horse!”112
Consequently, a new approach and new thinking to
address the threats are needed. As such, the following
recommendations should be considered by commanders and policymakers in order to begin to address the
issues.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Recommendation 1: Recognize OCGs as a
threat to U.S. Army operatons. Organized
crime must be recognized at all levels of the U.S.
Army command not as an independent threat
outside the scope of the U.S. Army, but as an
integral component of the security threat environment.
• Recommendation 2: Widen the scope of network analysis. Enhance intelligence assessments by widening the scope of network analysis to include OCGs and government officials.
Assessments should include key motivations
for collaborations, as well as how they occur.
Critically, emphasis must be given to illicit logistical supply chains and how these can be disrupted.
• Recommendation 3: Tackle corruption. Develop an understanding of how corruption enables
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•

•

•

•

partnerships to form between OCGs, irregular
groups, and state officials, and identify ways in
which this can be tackled.
Recommendation 4: Address intelligence
knowledge gaps. Identify and address existing
intelligence knowledge gaps as well as encourage military intelligence personnel to challenge
existing thinking in tackling the adversary. This
could be achieved through the adoption of a
multidisciplinary approach incorporating experts from different disciplines to avoid groupthink.
Recommendation 5: Provide training and education. Develop training and educational programs that will enable personnel to develop a
deeper understanding of how OCGs, irregular
groups, and corrupt state officials collaborate,
as well as why this is relevant in the context of
U.S. Army operations.
Recommendation 6: Adopt an integrated approach. Reach out to non-military partners,
where appropriate, to ensure that the widest
possible intelligence picture is captured on
OCGs and state actors, as well as to engage in
dialogue to develop a collaborative approach to
tackling the problem.
Recommendation 7: Prepare for unintended
consequences. Develop awareness as to how
tackling any one component of the threat may
have possible unintended consequences. Consider also how these can be mitigated.
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